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DIGEST OF RECENT U.S. CASES
STATE TAX ON FLIGHT EQUIPMENT-SITUSINTERSTATE COMMERCE-DUE PROCESS
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalizationand Assess.

ment
74 Sup. Ct. 757 (June 1, 1954).
Petitioner, incorporated in Oklahoma and with home port at St. Paul,
Minnesota, attacks the validity of a Nebraska statute imposing an apportioned ad valorem tax on its flight equipment in Nebraska where petitioner's
airplanes make eighteen scheduled stops daily to discharge and load passengers and freight. The Supreme Court, finding no violation of the commerce
or due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution, denied the petition for
declaratory judgment and injunction. Federal regulation of air commerce,
the Court stated, is based upon the commerce powers of Congress, not
national ownership of the airspace, and the Commerce Clause does not
immunize interstate air carriers from a fairly-apportioned, nondiscriminatory state tax consistent with existing federal regulation set forth in the
CAA. The Court found sufficient regular contact with Nebraska to establish a tax situs. Due process was satisfied since the tax was in proportion
to the protection and benefits received by petitioner during the stopover
of its planes in that state. In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
rejected the sufficiency of such contacts and viewed the Nebraska statute
as an intrusion on the Commerce Clause.
POWER OF CAB TO SPECIFY AIRPORT AS TERMINAL POINTNOTICE
City of Dallas v. Civil Aeronautics Board
4 CCH Avi 17,381 (D.C. Cir. May 20, 1954).
In granting authority requested by an airline to operate a new route
segment, the CAB designated Dallas and Fort Worth, Texas, as a single
terminal point to be served through Fort Worth's airport located midway
between the two cities. Petitioner argues that Dallas will not be well served
by the airport and that the CAB is without authority under section 401 (f)
of the CAA to make such designation. The court held that the CAB has
authority to designate an airport rather than a city as a terminal point.
As authorized by section 401 (f), the CAB order described "terminal
points" and "service to be rendered." This designation did not constitute
a "term, condition, or limitation" on the air carrier's right to control its
schedules, equipment, and facilities. The court further found that there
was sufficient notice to the parties that the issue of service through the
Fort Worth airport would be before the CAB, although the issue was not
specifically raised by the application for requested authority.
AIRLINE PASSENGER INSURANCE-VENDING MACHINESCOVERAGE
Lachs v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N. Y.
118 N.E. 2d 555 (Ill. Ed.) (Ct. of Appeals, N.Y. March 4, 1954).
Decedent purchased an insurance policy from an automatic vending
machine situated in front of the airport ticket counter and bearing the
sign "Airline Trip Insurance" in large letters. The policy's coverage clause,
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however, limited coverage to "Civilian Scheduled Airlines." Decedent
boarded a non-scheduled airliner and was killed in a crash. In an action
by the beneficiary, the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, stating that the term "scheduled airline" is ambiguous. Defendant
had the burden of showing that the term is susceptible of only one meaning, since the average person does not ordinarily distinguish between
"scheduled" and "nonscheduled" airlines. Clarity in meaning, continued
the court, was particularly essential in view of the use, location, and labeling
of the vending machine.
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION-COMMON USE FACILITIESRATES
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. City and County of San Franisco
119 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Cal. March 5, 1954).
Plaintiff airline leased from the defendant landing and take-off facilities
at the San Francisco Airport. Twice during the lease, the Public Utilities
Commission of San Francisco prescribed higher rates for use of the
Airport than those fixed by the lease. The Court denied declaratory relief
and directed plaintiff to account for unpaid charges. "Common use facilities" such as the plaintiff leased, asserted the court, constitute a public
utility service which the city charter empowers the Commission to regulate.
The lease agreement was valid when executed but binding as to rates only
in the absence of regulation by the Commission acting on behalf of the
public.
LIABILITY FOR CROP SPRAYING-DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
Pendergrassv. Lovelace
262 P. 2d 231 (New Mex. Sup. Ct. Oct. 9, 1953).
Defendant engaged an airplane operator who was an independent contractor to spray his infested premises. The owner of an adjacent cotton
field sues for damages to his property resulting from the spraying. The
court held the defendant liable relying on the exception to the rule that
an employer is not responsible for the negligence of an independent contractor. Since the spraying involved use of a potentially dangerous solution,
defendant could not delegate responsibility and escape liability.
TIME LIMITATIONS ON SUITS-TARIFFS FILED WITH CAB
Crowell v. Eastern Airlines
81 S.E. 2d 178 (N.C. Sup. Ct. April 7, 1954).
Before boarding the plane, plaintiff fell at defendant's airport premises
and sues for injuries. The ticket folder provided that time limits for
giving notice of claims and instituting suits were set forth in the carrier's
tariffs. Plaintiff failed to comply with the time limit specified in a tariff
filed with the CAB. The court held, by construing section 401 (a) of the
CAA and CAB regulations, that neither the CAA nor the CAB require the
air carrier to file such time limits. Therefore, plaintiff is not bound by
unauthorized tariffs. Moreover, a mere reference by the ticket folder to
limitations contained in the tariffs was not sufficient to bind the plaintiff.
It was further held that there was no basis in the lease for requiring the
city as lessor to indemnify the airline as lessee for such injuries.
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AIR FREIGHT FORWARDER-REGULATION OF COOPERATIVES
Consolidated Flower Shipments, Inc.-Bay Area v. Civil Aeronautics Board
4 CCH Avi 17,387 (9th Cir. June 9, 1954).
Petitioner is a non-profit cooperative association incorporated under the
Agricultural Code of California. Its exclusive business is that of a freight
forwarder in the shipment of flowers in the San Francisco area. The CAB
found that the petitioner was engaged indirectly in air transportation without qualifying to do so and issued a cease and desist order. In affirming
the order, the court found that the evidence supported the finding of the
public nature of petitioner's business and that it was engaged in air
freight forwarding within the scope of CAB regulation. While certain
cooperative freight forwarders in the rail and motor fields are specifically
exempt from regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act, there is no
such exemption in the CAA.
TRANSPORTATION OF SURFACE MAIL BY AIR-POWER OF
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD TO EXEMPT CARGO CARRIERS
FROM CERTIFICATION PROCEEDINGS
American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board
2 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 17,948 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 9, 1956).
Plaintiff carrier held a certificate of public convenience and necessity
which authorized the transportation of mail; it also carried surface mail
under an experiment being conducted by the Postmaster General. Certain
cargo-only carriers petitioned the Civil Aeronautics Board for permission
to carry surface mail under the experiment program. They maintained that
the Board had authority to permit this under Section 416 (b) of the Civil
Aeronautics Act which provided for exemptions from the usual certification
requirements for air carriers. The plaintiff contested these petitions, stating
that the Board lacked authority to issue exemptions to these cargo carriers
because there was no showing of "unusual circumstances," "undue burden,"
or "public interest" which the Statute required. The Post Office took the
position that as additional volume of mail was anticipated, the Board should
make available the additional facilities of the cargo carriers. The Board
granted exemptions to the cargo carriers, and the plaintiff appealed. Then
court affirmed the decision of the Board, holding that the statutory require-!I
ments of "undue burden" and "unusual circumstances" had been met by a ,
showing that certification proceedings had been instituted by the cargo!
carriers but would not be concluded in time to permit participation in the
experiment program. Also, this experiment was clearly in the public inter-,
est. A dissenting opinion by Edgerton, C. J., concluded that the timek.
required for certification proceedings was not an "unusual circumstance"
within the meaning of the Act.
MUTUAL EXCLUSIVITY OF AIR ROUTE APPLICATIONSJUDICIAL REVIEW OF CAB ORDERAPPLICATION OF ASHBACKER RULE
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board
2 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 17,817 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 24, 1955).
Eastern Air Lines filed an application with the Civil Aeronautics Board
seeking certain modifications in its east-west routes and also additional
north-south route segments for service between Cincinnati, Ohio, and
Memphis, Tennessee. Delta Air Lines also applied to the Board to add service between these two cities. Delta maintained that the traffic between
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these points would support only one service and that therefore the applications were mutually exclusive. Without the benefit of a hearing on this
issue, the Board ruled that they were not mutually exclusive. Delta petitioned for review and asked for a stay of Board proceedings on the Eastern
application. The Board proposed to conclude its hearing on the merits
of Eastern's application and in its final order decide (1) whether any new
north-south segments should be certified, (2) the exclusivity issue, and
(3) if the application were not found to be exclusive, whether Eastern
should be certified., The Board further contended that a "simultaneous decision" upon the two applications would satisfy the rule in the Ashbacker
case. The court, however, felt that the Board's interpretation of this case
would not sufficiently protect the rights of the second applicant, Delta. It
held that the Ashbacker rule should be construed to mean that "where the
applications of two qualified applicants for a license are as a matter of
economic fact mutually exclusive, each applicant is entitled to a comparative
hearing and consideration with his adversary. We think mere 'simultaneous
decision' does not meet the requirement." The requirement for a comparative proceeding was meant to encompass all the "give-and-take of contesting
parties, including cross examination, rebuttal, participation in prehearing
proceedings, objection, briefs and arguments as contesting parties." Thus,
the court held that the Board could not hear Eastern's application on its
merits without hearing Delta and without first deciding finally whether
Delta had a right to a hearing as a mutually exclusive applicant. The court
ordered a stay of the application proceedings until a decision on the issue
of exclusivity was reached.
LIABILITY OF CONTROL TOWER FOR CRASH ON ATTEMPTED
LANDING UNDER ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS
Smerdon v. United States
2 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 17,840 (D. Mass., Nov. 18, 1955).
Plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of the decedent, brought suit
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for alleged negligence of the government-operated control tower in permitting a visual landing of decedent's
plane in a heavy fog. The pilot of the plane involved was experienced and
proficient in the use of instruments in ground-controlled landings. On the
day when the accident occurred, he approached the Boston airport and was
advised by the tower that weather conditions were extremely poor and
visibility was below the minimum required for a visual landing. In addition, the tower's radar instruments were clouded by the precipitation to
such an extent that an instrument landing was impossible. The pilot was
advised of these facts when he was approximately six miles from Boston
Airport, but he also received a weather report from the tower concerning
a nearby airport where more favorable weather conditions prevailed. Mistaking this report for a description of conditions at the Boston airport,
and seeing a section of its runway, the pilot requested visual flight clearance
to make his landing. The tower granted the landing request and kept
constant radio contact with the pilot. When the plane was a half mile from
the end of the runway it entered a fog bank which engulfed it until it
crashed into Boston Harbor, causing the death of the plaintiff's decedent.
The plaintiff contended that under the safety regulation of the Civil Aeronautics Board the tower had a duty to the plane and its passengers to help
them land safely, and it failed in this duty by authorizing the visual landing.
The government replied that the tower only had the duty of clearing aircraft
in control areas in order to prevent collisions. The court held that the
tower did not 'have the responsibility of determining whether or not a
given weather condition was safe for landing. The tower performed its
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duty by furnishing official weather reports and clearing the air corridor
selected by the pilot for his landing. It was not up to the tower to dispute
the pilot's report of visibility, and therefore the court concluded that there
was no negligence shown under these facts.
MUNICIPAL AIRPORT-CONTROL OVER PRIVATE ACCESS ROADDENIAL OF COMMON LAW DEDICATION.
City of Oakland v. Burns
289 P. 2d 271 (Cal. District Court of Appeal, Oct. 31, 1955).
The City owned and operated an airport through its board of port
commissioners. The principal roadway to the airport had been paved and
maintained by the board, and it had been, and still was, open to the public
at all times for access to the terminal building, hangars, and other installations. A City ordinance prohibited the operation of commercial ground
transportation services to or from the airport in the absence of approval
by the board. Pursuant to this and other regulatory ordinances, the board
awarded an exclusive contract for the furnishing of transportation services
to the airport to a specified carrier. The defendant was a competing carrier
who held a certificate of public convenience and necessity granted by the
Public Utilities Commission. This certificate gave him the right to provide
limousine service to the airport over the most appropriate public streets
and highways. The plaintiff City instituted this action to enjoin this service
on the ground that the access road was a private road on airport property,
and as such was under the exclusive control of the board. The defendant
contended, successfully in the trial court, that this road had been dedicated
to the public through its continued and open use over a period of 25 years.
On appeal, reversed, on the ground that the City had no capacity to dedicate
the road without following the statutory formalities for the opening of
public streets. The court recognized that a municipal corporation may dedicate land that it holds as a private owner, but it held that the Oakland
City Charter contained exclusive provisions with respect to the opening
of streets which did not include dedication. The court also noted that an
easement by prescription could not be acquired against a municipal corporation because the public as a whole had an interest in land set aside for
general use.
MUNICIPAL AIRPORTS LOCATED IN ADJACENT TOWNSHIPEFFECT OF LOCAL ZONING ORDINANCE
Aviation Services, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of the Township of Hanover
119 A. 2d 761 (N.J. Sup. Ct., Jan. 9, 1956).
The plaintiff's lessor, the town of Morristown, New Jersey, had acquired
a tract of land located within the boundaries of the defendant Township.
This property was developed as the municipal airport of Morristown and
a portion of the airstrip and buildings were leased to the plaintiff, an air
flight school. Pursuant to an expansion program the plaintiff applied to
the building inspector of the Township of Hanover for permission to reconstruct and enlarge the buildings it had leased. This improvement had been
authorized by Morristown, but the application was denied by the Township
on the ground that a local zoning ordinance had impliedly excluded airports
from these residential areas. The plaintiff then filed a complaint which in
substance contested the right of the Township to subject the Morristown
Municipal Airport to its zoning ordinance. The trial court denied effect to
the ordinance. On appeal to the Supreme Court of New Jersey the Township maintained that the airport was a public utility and therefore was
exempt from zoning regulations only after specific findings of public neces-
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sity by the state Public Utilities Commission. The court stated that an
airport was not a public utility as defined by statute, but at any rate, the
legislative authorization of municipal airports indicated an intent to immunize the acquisition and maintenance of airports from local zoning
power. The policy of encouraging progress through local air facilities and
the interest of the public in the use of these services demand a freedom
from local restriction, but the court limited its decision by noting that it
was not to be construed as giving judicial recognition to a program of
wholesale aggrandizement of territory.
POWER OF LOCAL PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION TO MODIFY
MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS-COMMON USE FACILITIES AT AIRPORT
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco
2 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 17,866 (9th Cir., Dec. 19, 1955).
In 1942 the plaintiff Carrier and the defendant City entered into a
formal agreement for a period of 25 years whereby the Carrier leased
hangar and office space in the City's airport at a fixed charge. In addition,
the lease covered certain "common use" facilities including landing fields,
runways, aprons, and the like. In 1950 the Public Utility Commission of
the City issued a resolution purporting to fix the charges for the "common
use" facilities at a rate higher than that specified in the 1942 agreement;
thereupon the Carrier brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to
hold the City to the terms of its contract. The City defended on the ground
that the 1942 agreement was superseded by the Commission's resolution,
and this defense was sustained by the District Court. On appeal this judgment was reversed on the theory that California state law permitted a city
to establish by contract the rates to be charged by an airport for a lease
of this nature. The court recognized that under the California Constitution
a state statute could not regulate a "municipal affair," but as construed,
this term did not include the operation of a municipal airport. Thus, the
court concluded that the City could not abrogate a valid contract expressly
authorized by state law.
AIRLINE TRIP INSURANCE POLICY-COVERAGE DURING FLIGHT
ON CONNECTING AIRLINE-NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Commander v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York
2 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 17,852 (W.D. Va., Oct. 8, 1955).
An action was commenced on a standard air insurance policy by the
beneficiary of the insured after the latter was lost in a forced landing at
sea. The policy covered the insured "while riding in or on a conveyance...
provided or arranged for, directly or indirectly, by (the) airline. . .

."

In

this case the insured had purchased a ticket from American Airlines for a
trip from Newark, New Jersey, to Provincetown, Masachusetts, with a
change of planes at Boston. It was during the flight from Boston to Provincetown, on the connecting airline, that the accident occurred. The beneficiary of the policy was the wife of the insured, and when she learned of
her husband's death, she fell into a state of shock that lasted two or three
weeks. The defendant was not notified of the loss until approximately two
months after the accident. It resisted payment on two grounds: (1) that
the term "conveyance" as used in the policy did not include a flight on a
connecting airline, and (2) that the plaintiff had not complied with the
notice requirements of the policy. The court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover the face amount of the policy; the connecting flight was
clearly covered by the terms of the policy, and the plaintiff gave notice to
the defendant within a reasonable period after loss. The court pointed out
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that as the policy had been drawn by the defendant, a liberal construction
of its terms was to be afforded to the plaintiff.
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION-IDENTITY OF PILOT
ESTABLISHED BY PRESUMPTION
Drahmann v. Brink
2 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 17,918 (Ky. Court of Appeals, Jan. 27, 1956).
In an action brought for the wrongful death of a guest passenger in
a private plane which crashed while attempting to land, the trial court
directed a verdict for the defendant, the estate of the owner of the plane.
The deceased, Brink and Drahmann, were business associates. Brink owned
a private plane which he used for business purposes, and he invited Drahmann to accompany him on a business trip to Miami, Florida. Brink was
a skilled and experienced pilot, while Drahmann knew nothing about the
operation of aircraft. The plane was equipped with dual controls, only one
set of which could be operated at a time. It was shown that Brink piloted
the plane to Florida without event and was also operating the controls on
the take-off for the return flight. The plane crashed, killing both occupants,
in Atlanta, Georgia after a series of unsuccessful attempts to land at the
airport in that city. Eye witnesses reported that on the first of these
attempts the plane overshot the runway and executed proper maneuvers for
regaining altitude. However, a second attempt on another runway was so
improperly performed so as to indicate that it was not managed by an
experienced pilot. As a result of numerous departures from proper flight
procedure, the plane stalled and crashed to the ground. On appeal, the court
held that the foregoing facts were sufficient evidence of gross negligence
on the part of the pilot to warrant the submission of the case to the jury;
furthermore, the identity of the pilot could properly be established by
inference or rebuttable presumption. As all facts pointed to Brink's control
of the plane, the court concluded that in the absence of contrary proof, he
would be considered as the pilot of the plane, and the issue of his negligence
would be determined by a jury. A dissenting opinion by Sims, J., pointed
out that negligence can never be presumed, and the cause of this fatal
crash, and whose negligence, if anybody's, was responsible for it, would
be left purely to surmise and guesswork. He therefore felt that there was
no issue which could be submitted to a jury.
DEFECTIVE AIRCRAFT ENGINES-SUIT AGAINST
MANUFACTURER, SUIT AGAINST VENDOR
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtis-Wright Corporation
2 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 17,849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 1, 1955).
TWA purchased certain airplanes from the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation which carried engines manufactured by Curtis-Wright, the defendant.
As a result of latent defects in these engines, they failed to operate properly and it was necessary for TWA to spend large sums of money to repair
and restore them to working condition. TWA sued the manufacturer for
these expenditures. The court held that the proper remedy in this situation
was an action against the vendor of the airplanes, Lockheed, on an implied
warranty theory, and not a suit directed toward the manufacturer. The
basis for this holding was the fact that no accident had occurred as a result
of the manufacturer's negligence. The court stated that no actionable wrong
was committed if the danger caused by the manufacturer's negligence was
averted; if an ultimate user were permitted to sue the manufacturers in
such a case, "there would be nothing left of the citadel of privity and not
much scope for the law of warranty." (See Note, this edition, for discussion of liability of manufacturers for structural or design defects. Ed.)

